On the job market, 2026–27
Economics PhD candidate, Colorado State University
My research investigates how the structure of an economy shapes what policy can do and how policy can reshape that structure. I study how far fiscal shocks travel in production networks and argue that where fiscal policy lands, not just how much is spent, matters for aggregate outcomes. This dovetails with my modeling of how industrial policies, like Sweden's solidaristic wage policy, can induce structural change while compressing wage inequality.
How far do fiscal shocks travel through a production network? I answer this question for the euro area by applying the network granular instrumental variable (N-GIV) approach of Chodorow-Reich et al. (2026) to FIGARO inter-country input-output tables covering 1,178 country-sectors over the period 2010–2019. The method identifies two reduced-form propagation parameters: the share of a shock transmitted upstream from customers to suppliers (the demand channel) and the share transmitted downstream from suppliers to customers (the supply channel). I develop a static production network model with monopolistic competition and constant returns, that predicts an asymmetric response: quantities respond to demand shocks only through the demand channel, while prices respond to cost shocks only through the supply channel. I then test the model empirically, confirming these results. Each link in the network passes on 41 percent of a demand shock to employment and 32 percent to gross output, while 40 percent of a cost shock passes through to relative prices; the cross-channel parameters are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The implied propagation multipliers show that 17 percent of the employment response and 12 percent of the gross output response to government spending arise from network transmission beyond the sector where the spending lands first. Intuitively, sectors that are further away through the network see almost no effect from the shock, implying that the sectoral composition of fiscal policy matters for its aggregate effects.
I develop a theoretical model of the solidaristic wage policy at the core of Sweden's Rehn–Meidner Model, which used centralized bargaining to set equal pay for equal work independent of firm profitability. In a two-firm economy where each firm operates its own distribution of capital vintages, capacity utilization is determined by which vintages are profitable to run at the prevailing wage. Under free competition, firm-specific wage structures allow low-productivity capital to survive and drag down aggregate productivity. By setting a common wage, the solidaristic wage policy selects an equilibrium that lowers the capacity utilization of the low-productivity firm and raises utilization for the high-productivity firm. The policy compresses wages, squeezes profits at the laggard firm while generating excess profits for the leader and induces technological upgrading or exit.
The Nordic economies are typically studied through the lens of the welfare state. This paper argues that they also pursued a distinct strategy of structural transformation. Building on the Rehn-Meidner (RM) model applied in postwar Sweden, I characterize a Nordic developmentalism in which solidaristic wage policy, active labor market policy, and restrictive fiscal policy operate as a complementary policy package that drove structural change, while maintaining international competitiveness. Wage compression put pressure on less productive firms while generating excess profits for more productive ones, and labor market policy facilitated the reallocation of workers toward the latter. Situating the RM model within the broader literature on developmentalism, I argue that it constitutes a distinct variety, one that considers equality as an instrument for structural change and ensures, through active labor market policy and the welfare state, that displaced workers are not abandoned. I contrast Swedish development with that of the United States, where decentralized wage bargaining supported a different but successful path of development, one that achieved growth with considerably greater inequality. I then discuss the internal contradictions of the RM model, conflict over the excess profits it generated, that made it vulnerable to collapse.
Drafts are available on request.
ECON 304
New Keynesian theory, economic fluctuations, inflation, and growth.
Course pageECON 240
Market failures, policy instruments, and sustainability economics.
ECON 204
Introductory macroeconomics, with recitation sections and tutoring.
ECON 202
Foundational microeconomic theory and applications.
Social Sciences Hall C-3916B
Department of Economics
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado
United States